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A b s tra c t. This paper discusses how electronic voting was implemented 
in practice in the Netherlands, which choices were made and how elec­
tronic voting was finally abolished. This history is presented in the con­
text of the requirements of the election process, as well as the technical 
options that are available to increase the reliability and security of elec­
tronic voting.
1 In trodu ction
In information security research, electronic voting is considered a particularly 
interesting topic. This may be due to a number of reasons. First of all, elections 
usually have high media coverage, especially if something goes wrong. This makes 
it easy to explain the societal relevance of the research. Furthermore, electronic 
voting seems to have a unique combination of security requirements: voters need 
to be authenticated, results need to be verifiable, but it should not be possible 
to link a vote to a voter.
The secret ballot requirement, in combination with the so-called Australian 
ballot, listing all candidates on a single sheet, was introduced in many countries 
in the 19th century (see e.g. [28, 35]). It is now seen as a cornerstone of election 
law and international treaties: without the secret ballot, voters could be subject 
to all kinds of bribery and coercion, for it would be possible to observe the 
choices they would make in the election. Combined with the demand th a t results 
be verifiable, this requires well-designed procedures. It turns out not to be easy 
to computerise the intuitive ballot box property tha t what goes in will also come 
out, unaltered and unlinkably, especially if it is not allowed to  reveal the identity 
of the voter.
Many electronic voting systems th a t have been deployed worldwide were not 
especially designed to meet the demand of verifiability. Votes may indeed be 
stored such tha t they cannot be traced back to the voter, guaranteeing secrecy 
of the ballot, but at the same time it is not always possible to judge afterwards if 
a vote was cast by an eligible voter, or produced by software malfunction or ma­
licious activities. Because they are generally newer and operate over an insecure
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infrastructure, it may be expected tha t Internet voting systems involve more 
efforts to meet verifiability requirements. W hether or not these efforts suffice 
is a topic of scientific and political debate. As often happens, computerisation 
of existing procedures leads to a critical reflection on these procedures. This is 
what we have witnessed over the last decade for voting. The discussion is partic­
ularly interesting for voting because of the combination of non-trivial scientific 
challenges and high societal relevance and interest.
In this paper, we focus on the practical issues involved in electronic voting, 
both in the context of voting machines at polling stations and in the context of 
Internet voting. We focus on the situation in the Netherlands because a radical 
change of position took place there. For electronic voting machines, the Dutch 
were both early adopters and early abolishers. The machines were introduced 
on a large scale in the 1990s, and their use was discontinued in 2008 after a 
short and effective campaign by a pressure group. Meanwhile, experiments with 
Internet voting had taken place using two completely different systems. While 
following these developments in a loosely chronological order, many of the issues 
involved in e-voting will be discussed.
In section 2, we discuss the emergence of electronic voting in the Netherlands, 
as well as the requirements tha t are thought to apply to the election process. 
We also give an overview of techniques tha t are available to increase the security 
of electronic voting. In section 3, we describe the controversy th a t was started 
by an activist group in 2006. We discuss the issues tha t were brought up and 
attem pted solutions. In section 4, we describe the Internet voting experiments 
in the Netherlands. In section 5, we analyse the controversy on electronic voting 
in terms of trust.
2 R equirem ents and techniques
2.1 H is to ry  o f D u tc h  e lec tio n s
The Netherlands are a constitutional monarchy, and have a system of propor­
tional representation for local and national elections. Universal suffrage is in 
place since 1917 (male) and 1919 (female).
There is no registration procedure. Eligible people received a polling card by 
mail a couple of weeks before the elections, based on (local) citizen registrations. 
This polling card was handed in at the polling station. One could be asked to 
present identification, but the general feeling is tha t this hardly ever happened. 
Each polling station had a list of local residents who where expected to vote at 
that station. The residents names were marked on a list after handing in the 
polling card (and proceeding to cast a vote), in order to prevent multiple votes 
by one individual. When voting was limited to the local polling station, one 
could also vote with a passport instead of a polling card. Now tha t experiments 
are being run with voting in any polling station within the municipality, this 
is not possible anymore, because there is no central voter register for keeping 
track of who already voted. This has led to some complaints in recent elections 
by people who lost or forgot their polling cards.
Particularly noteworthy is the liberal policy in the Netherlands for voting 
by proxy. Since 1928, the option of “stemmen bij volmacht” (voting by proxy) 
exists: one can authorise other people to  cast one’s vote. It is meant to be used 
in case of illness or absence, but this option is not really appreciated elsewhere 
(see the critical remarks in [27], especially in relation to secrecy of the vote). The 
possibilities for authorisation have been restricted over time, because, especially 
in local elections, there had been cases of active vote gathering. By now, each 
individual is only allowed to have two authorisations. It is not necessary to 
register a proxy vote; one simply signs the polling card and hands it to the 
designated proxy.
Since 1983, Dutch citizens living abroad, or having job duties abroad during 
the elections, are allowed to vote by postal ballot. The postal ballot needs to be 
accompanied by a signed statem ent and sent to  the election office in The Hague 
or a special office in the country of residence. Postal voting is not allowed within 
the country.3
The Netherlands were quick to introduce electronic voting. In 1965, a legal 
provision was put in place to allow the use of machines, including electronic ones, 
in voting. In the late 1980s, attem pts were made to automatise the counting, 
and the first electronic voting machines appeared. From 1994, the government 
actively promoted the use of electronic voting machines in elections. Local gov­
ernments were enthusiastic, mainly about the modern character and adminis­
trative efficiency and advantages of these machines: easy, push-button voting, 
reduction of the number of polling stations, fast delivery of results. Since then, 
voting machines have been used extensively during elections. Little attention 
was paid at the time to security and verification possibilities. The main concerns 
were related to the usability of the machines, especially for elderly people. How 
the votes were counted and how the result was calculated did not seem to be of 
much public interest. The introduction of these machines was uncontroversial.
In 1997, regulation on voting machines was established, including an exten­
sive list of requirements tha t voting machines had to  meet ( “Regeling voor­
waarden en goedkeuring stemmachines” ). Demands on the verifiability of the 
counting, however, largely remained unspecified. Moreover, criteria for software 
that calculates the results from the totals of the individual machines had not 
been assessed at all. In 1999, local authorities were even reported to have used 
self-written software for this purpose [10].
Voting machines in the Netherlands had to be approved by an evaluation 
institute. Although multiple institutes could be designated in principle, only 
TNO has been involved in this procedure thus far. Only TNO (the department 
doing the evaluation now being called BrightSight) was given the source code 
of the software running on the machines, and the evaluation reports were not 
public either.
The full requirements specification, consisting of 14 sections, was found as 
an appendix to the regulation. We quote and translate the items from section
3 Source: www.parlement.com, an excellent site on Dutch politics (in Dutch only, alas)
8: Reliability and security of the voting machine. The “normal environmental 
conditions” referred to are specified elsewhere in the requirements.
1. The vote stored in the vote memory of the voting machine is the vote cast 
and confirmed by the voter;
2. A cast vote cannot be lost due to breakdown of the energy supply, failure 
of one component, “normal” environmental conditions (as specified), normal 
use, or mistakes in the operation of the voting machine;
3. The read-in lists of candidates are maintained completely in case of break­
down of the energy supply, normal environmental conditions, normal use, or 
mistakes in the operation of the voting machine;
4. The functions of the voting machine are maintained completely in case of 
breakdown of the energy supply, normal environmental conditions, normal 
use, or mistakes in the operation of the voting machine;
5. The storage of the cast votes is made redundant. The vote is stored in such 
a redundant way in the vote memory, tha t it can be proved th a t the failure 
rate is 10-6 . If there is a discrepancy in the redundant storage, the machine 
will report this to  the voter and the voting station;
6. The voting machine is able to avoid or reduce the possibilities for accidental 
or intended incorrect use as much as is technically feasible in fairness;
7. The way of vote storage does not enable possibilities to derive the choice of 
individual voters;
8. The voting machine has features which help to avoid erroneous actions during 
repair, maintenance and checks, for example by mechanical features which 
preclude assembly in wrong positions or in wrong places;
9. The voting machine may have functions which are not described in the Elec­
tion Law, the Election Decree, or this appendix, as long as they do not 
impair the required functionality of the voting machine and are related to 
the voting procedure.
Note tha t the possibility of recount or other forms of verification are not men­
tioned at all. Furthermore, most of the requirements above concern correctness 
under normal circumstances, and not protection against possible election fraud.
2.2 N e d ap  v o tin g  m a c h in e s /c o m p u te rs
The most widely used voting machines were produced by the Dutch company 
Nedap, see Figure 1. These were so-called full-face direct recording electronic vot­
ing machines (DRE) with a button for each candidate. Such a Nedap machine 
contains a Motorola 68000 processor from the 1980s, together with EPROM 
(2x 128KB for the software binary), EEPROM (8KB) and RAM (8KB) mem­
ory [13]. It has two simple screens, one for the voter, and one on the election 
officials’ console for enabling the machine. The votes are stored in memory in a 
redundant manner, in arbitrary order. The system software determining the be­
haviour of these machines can easily be changed, simply by plugging in different 
EPROM chips. In this way one can make the machine store votes for one party
as votes for another party. One can build this software in such a way that it is 
practically impossible to detect, see [13] for details.
The verification possibility th a t these Nedap machines offered is the compar­
ison of the votes per candidate to the votes per party, and to the total number 
of votes cast. This check, however, is based on votes tha t have already been 
processed by the machine. There was no paper trail.
It is interesting to note th a t this voting equipment has been referred to as 
a voting machine, since its introduction. The word “machine” suggests a single, 
unchangeable functionality. One of the im portant points raised by the pressure 
group against e-voting (see subsection 3.1) is that they should not be called 
“voting machines” but “voting computers”: there is no single unchangeable func­
tionality, because they are proper computers tha t can be made to do anything. 
To illustrate this point it was shown [13] tha t they could be adapted to play 
chess, or to count fraudulently. Since then it has become almost an ideological 
issue whether to speak of “voting machines” or of “voting computers” in the 
Netherlands. Even though we agree that the most appropriate word is “com­
puter” , we shall stick to the more common, historical way of referring to them 
as “machines” .
More recently, touch-screen based systems marketed by the former state press 
Sdu were also used, notably in Amsterdam, see Figure 1.
2.3 R e q u ire m e n ts
In 2007, an official Election Process Advisory Commission was formed, see sub­
section 3.2 below. It formulated the following requirements for elections, which 
we quote together with their explanation.
— T ra n sp a re n c y
The election process should be organised in such a way tha t the 
structure and organisation is clear, so that everyone in principle can
understand it. There must be no secrets in the election process: ques­
tions must be able to be answered, and the answers must be verifi­
able.
— V erifiab ility
The election process should be objectively verifiable. The verification 
tools may differ, depending on the method of voting tha t is decided 
upon.
— F airness
The election process should operate in a proper manner, and the 
results must not be capable of being influenced other than by the 
casting of lawful votes.
— E lig ib ility  to  v o te
Only persons eligible to vote must be allowed to take part in the 
election.
— F ree su ffrage
Every elector must be able to choose how to vote in complete free­
dom, free from influence.
— S ecre t su ffrage
It must be impossible to connect the identity of a person casting a 
vote to the vote cast. The process should be organised in such a way 
tha t it is impossible to make a voter indicate how he or she voted.
— E q u a l su ffrage
Each voter, given the Dutch election system, must be allowed to cast 
only one vote in each election, which must be counted precisely once.
— A ccessib ility
Voters should be enabled as far as possible to participate directly 
in the election process. If this is impossible, there must be a way of 
taking part indirectly, i.e. by proxy.
It is widely acknowledged tha t not all requirements can be guaranteed absolutely, 
certainly not in combination with each other. For example, paper voting in 
polling stations is usually judged to provide high guarantees with respect to 
most of the requirements, but scores quite low on accessibility. Similarly, there 
are tensions between secrecy on the one hand and authentication and verifiability 
on the other.
2.4 T echn iques
Several techniques are available to realise these requirements (to a certain degree) 
in electronic voting systems. Some of those have only been the subject of aca­
demic analysis, others have been used in real elections. In advanced systems from 
academia, a distinction can be made (see e.g. [16,36]) between protocols based 
on mix-nets, protocols based on blind signatures and protocols based on homo­
morphic encryption. These systems have rarely been used in elections though. 
More practically oriented systems have been based on public key infrastructures, 
randomised ballots, and hashes. If we do not focus on the electronic possibilities
for securing information only, visual cryptography, voter verified paper audit 
trails and trusted parties can help in achieving security goals.
In order to give an impression of the field, each of these techniques will be 
described briefly in this subsection. We start with an explanation of the general 
use of cryptography in voting. For more information we refer to [36] and the 
references therein.
C ry p to g ra p h y  Key to all secure electronic voting systems is the use of cryptog­
raphy, often abbreviated to “crypto” : technology developed in order to  protect 
information by manipulating the information itself. Cryptography can be used 
to protect the confidentiality or integrity and /o r  authenticity of information. The 
former is realised by encryption, the latter by signing.
Encryption means scrambling data according to a certain procedure, such 
that they become unrecognisable. Typically, a (cryptographic) key is a parameter 
in a fixed scrambling method, such as DES or AES. The key is usually just a 
very big number. A key is also needed for decryption, the recovery of the original 
data. This key may be the same as or different from the encryption key. The 
science of designing and analysing encryption schemes is called cryptology.
If the same key is used for both encryption and decryption, one speaks about 
sym m etric  or secret key crypto. If different keys are required for encryption and 
decryption, one calls this asym m etric  or public key crypto. The main advantage 
of public key crypto is tha t the problem of establishing a shared key before the 
transaction is reduced. Instead of having to define a shared secret key for each 
pair of users, a certificate ascribes a public key to a person or organisation. This 
public key can be used to send secret messages to  tha t agent, which only the 
agent itself can decrypt using its private key .
The other way around, the agent can use its private key to sign messages. 
The signature can be checked by anyone in order to verify the integrity of the 
data, using the public key in the certificate. The certificate, in its turn, is signed 
by a higher authority to ensure its authenticity.
Secret-key crypto is generally much faster than public-key crypto. Security- 
enhanced websites typically use public-key crypto for authentication, based on 
the site’s certificate, during which a session key is established. The session key 
is used in a secret-key scheme for the remainder of the transaction.
It is im portant to realise tha t most of these techniques provide computational 
security as opposed to unconditional security. This means tha t security is based 
on mathematical problems tha t are hard to  solve, but not impossible. If one 
manages to solve the mathematical problem, one can break the confidentiality 
or integrity of the messages sent. It will take more than a reasonable amount 
of time to solve them  with current computers. If computers get faster, we may 
start using longer keys to keep new data secure. However, if someone for some 
reason stored data encrypted using the old, short numbers, these may then be 
easily recovered. So-called ‘forward security’ is im portant in voting: even after a 
very long time it should not be possible to reveal encrypted votes, for instance 
by brute-force trying.
Future developments, like in quantum  computing, may pose more fundamen­
tal challenges to  these assumptions. If we manage to  build real quantum comput­
ers, the mathematically hard problems may not be hard for these new machines 
at all, for instance via Shor’s algorithm for integer factorisation. However, new 
techniques are being developed tha t use quantum  primitives to  provide so-called 
“unconditional” security, which is not dependent on limits of computational 
power. If these developments are successful, they may have major consequences 
for e-voting systems (and many other systems as well).
P K I  PKI stands for Public K ey Infrastructure. Voting systems based on PKI, 
such as the Estonian system [22], typically use the system of public keys and 
certificates also applied to for example e-commerce websites. In the Estonian 
system, the voter encrypts the vote with the election’s public key and then signs 
it with her own private key to prove authenticity. Such systems require each 
voter to have a certificate and a private key. The private key must be available 
to the voter in a way tha t is both secure and easy to use. In the Estonian case, 
the private key is embedded in a smartcard. Then, voters will need a smartcard 
plus an installed sm artcard reader to be able to vote on their own computer. 
Due to the limited availability of sm artcard readers among voters, PKI-based 
systems are currently not the best in terms of accessibility.
B lin d  s ig n a tu re s  Normally, one signs a message tha t one knows the contents 
of. It would be possible to  put a signature on a message on carbon paper within 
a sealed envelope. In this way, I could decide to sign exactly one message for 
each of my friends, after identifying them.
The electronic equivalent of this procedure is called a blind signature (see 
e.g. [4]). Blind signatures are useful if we wish to  allow voters to choose their 
own election credentials, e.g. a key used to encrypt their vote. They can do this 
without having to reveal this information to the authorities, through the blinding 
procedure. They “blind” the information, have it signed, and “unblind” it again. 
By means of this method, a combination can be achieved of authenticity and 
anonymity of the vote. Still, the communication channel will need protection, 
since it is otherwise easy to see from which computer a vote originates.
M ix -n e ts  When using a ballot box, votes come out in an order different from 
the order in which they went in. This ensures anonymity of the voters. How to do 
this electronically? In mix-nets (see e.g. [34,1]), encrypted messages are passed 
on between different authorities, making sure tha t no-one can derive a relation 
between the messages going in and the messages coming out. Basically, this is 
done by having each authority change the order of the votes. The authorities 
have to prove tha t the content of the messages is still the same after they shuffled 
them. After the last step, the votes are decrypted. This technique can be used in 
voting, to  make sure tha t no-one can gain any information from the order of the 
votes, unless all of the authorities cooperate. In this way, it is made sure that 
votes are kept anonymous.
H o m o m o rp h ic  e n c ry p tio n  Another way to  ensure anonymity is to count the 
votes while encrypted. In this way, one calculates a result from the individual 
votes without revealing the contents of each individual vote. This is exactly 
what homomorphic encryption achieves (see e.g. [7, 8,16]). For example, we may 
multiply all the encrypted votes to ensure tha t if we decrypt the result, this 
represents the addition of the original votes.
V isu a l c ry p to g ra p h y  a n d  ra n d o m ise d  b a llo ts  Many systems employ a 
“take-one-destroy-one” principle to ensure security properties. In such a scheme, 
the vote consists of two parts, which are kept separated, and which do not reveal 
the vote individually. One example is the visual crypto scheme by [5]. Here, two 
visual patterns can be combined to a pattern  revealing the vote. Pret-a-Voter by 
[6] has a similar setup. Here, the voter takes a receipt, but the order of the can­
didates on the ballot will be destroyed. The order is different on each ballot. The 
particular order belonging to a ballot can only be recovered through processing 
by a mix-net, such tha t each individual vote is kept secret, by separating the vote 
and the order of the candidates on the ballot. Usability may be a weak factor in 
these schemes, since voters will have to perform more complicated tasks. Also, 
voters are prevented from “preparing” their vote at home by finding the name 
of the candidate on a pre-published candidate list. On the other hand, putting 
the candidates in different order on each ballot may improve the fairness of the 
election, because it avoids a possible bias of the voters towards the first-listed 
candidates [6].
One of the threats to online voting is the possibility of a virus on the voter’s 
computer altering the vote. Randomised ballots may also help to prevent such 
attacks. Each candidate is then represented by a number, but these numbers are 
different on each ballot. If the ballot is sent to the voter via traditional mail, 
and the voter only has to  enter a number on a website, it is nearly impossible 
for the virus to  change the voter’s choice into one for the party  of the virus’s 
choice. This technique was used in the Dutch KOA online voting experiments of 
2004 (see Section 4).
C o m m itm e n ts  Some voting systems allow anyone to  calculate the result. This 
can be done by providing before the election a table which can be used to 
count each possible individual vote. Of course, one cannot put the possible votes 
themselves in this table, because tha t would allow people to copy them  and 
send them  in as fake votes. However, there are ways to  identify some piece of 
information uniquely (at least with very high probability), without revealing the 
information itself. Such arrangements are called com m itm ents. W hat can be put 
in the table instead is for instance a fingerprint, a hash of each vote.
A hash is a cryptographic operation th a t assigns to a possibly long document 
a relatively small sequence of bits. The operation should satisfy the following 
properties:
— a hash can be efficiently computed from a document;
— it is practically impossible to reconstruct the document from the hash;
— it is practically impossible to find two documents with the same hash.
These properties prevent the reconstruction of valid votes from the table, but 
when a vote is received it can easily be looked up and counted.
T ru s te d  p a r tie s  Not all security is technical. It is doubtful whether a tech­
nically perfect system can be built, and if so, whether it would be practical. 
Often, the security of the whole system is based on procedural as well as techni­
cal measures. The procedural measures should include a separation and division 
of responsibilities. In this way, the voter will not have to have full faith in one 
organisation, but she can be confident tha t problems can only occur if all of 
the involved organisations cooperate maliciously. The RIES system (section 4) 
suffers from limited separation of tasks [17].
Still, even in standard public key crypto, we need trusted organisations to 
sign the certificates tha t ascribe a public key to a person. Also, in some communi­
cation protocols it is assumed tha t one of the participants is fair. This participant 
is usually called a trusted third party (TTP). How much trust we should really 
place in such parties when it comes to  voting is a legitimate question.
V o te r verified  p a p e r  a u d it  t ra ils  A solution to improve the security of 
electronic voting tha t has become very popular in the US is the Voter Verified 
Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), as proposed by Rebecca Mercuri [23]. This basically 
means tha t a voting machine not only stores the vote electronically but also 
produces a separate print of each vote, which can be used in case a recount is 
demanded. The print is verified by the voter and then deposited in a ballot box. 
More than half of the states in the US have now passed legislation making a 
paper trail mandatory.
Some people argue tha t a VVPAT does not help much in improving security, 
because people will have a hard time checking their vote, due to the large number 
of races on which they have to vote in a single election in the US. It has been 
suggested to use an audio trail instead [37]. Also, an im portant question is what 
to do if in the end the electronic trail and the paper trail differ. Which one has 
to be preferred? If this question is not properly addressed in advance, VVPAT 
does not make much sense.
None of these security measures were implemented in the electronic voting 
machines used in the Netherlands. In the end, this led to major criticism, as 
we will see in the next section. The Internet voting experiments, which we will 
address in section 4, did use some.
3 C ontroversy
3.1 “W e d o n ’t  t r u s t  v o tin g  c o m p u te rs”
There have been some isolated incidents and accusations during the history of 
electronic voting in the Netherlands before 2006. In 1998, it was found tha t the
machines led to a competitive advantage for the numbers 31 of the candidate lists 
of the parties. Due to space restrictions, these were placed at the top of a second 
column, next to the candidates heading the lists. Also in 1998, Hans Janm aat, 
a right-wing maverick, accused the voting machines of deliberately reducing his 
number of seats.
Criticism of the obscurity of the election procedure when using voting ma­
chines has risen after 2000. Main reasons were the secrecy of the source code 
and the evaluation reports, and the lack of verifiability. Attem pts to retrieve the 
source code of the machines via the Freedom of Information Act failed, because 
the source code is intellectual property of the producer. But after Ireland judged 
the Nedap machines they bought unfit for use in the elections,4 Dutch citizens 
and politicians started asking questions about the safety and verifiability of such 
machines. At first, the government responded tha t everything was OK and not 
much happened.
In Fall 2006, a chain of events completely changed the e-voting battleground 
in the Netherlands. A pressure group called “Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers 
niet” ( “We don’t trust voting computers” ) was founded around June by Rop 
Gonggrijp, who was soon joined by Maurice Wessling. Gonggrijp managed to 
get hold of a couple of Nedap voting machines, took them  apart and reverse- 
engineered the source code [13]. The results of the analysis were made public 
in a national television programme on October 4, with the general elections 
scheduled for November 22 [13]. The first main problem tha t was illustrated was 
the easy replacement of the program chips, allowing the attacker to have the 
machine count incorrectly, or execute any other desired task. Due to the lack of 
verifiability features, such attacks could go unnoticed: the machine would be able 
to perform according to its own will. The second main problem shown was the 
possibility to eavesdrop on the voting machine via a tem pest5 attack. Tempest 
involves listening to so-called “compromising emanations” , i.e. radio emission 
from the device, in this particular case the display. Also, problems were found 
with the (physical) security of the storage facilities where the machines are kept 
in between elections.
The tempest attack was particularly successful because there is a special 
(diacritical) character in the full name of one of the parties. This required the 
display to switch to a different mode with a different refresh frequency, which 
could easily be detected.6 The responsible minister responded to the findings of 
the activists by having all the EPROM chips containing the software binaries 
replaced with non-reprogrammable ones (a questionable solution, but the public 
bought it), seals on all the machines, and having the intelligence agency look 
into the tem pest problem. Tempest expertise is scarce, but typically exists in 
those circles.
4 h ttp ://w w w .c e v .ie /h tm /re p o rt/firs t_ re p o rt.h tm , consulted May 28, 2009.
5 Also written TEMPEST, supposedly being an acronym for Telecommunications 
Electronics Material Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmission or something 
similar. For more information, see Chapter 15 of [3].
6 See the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B05wPomCjEY.
The fix for the diacritical character problem was easy (don’t use special 
characters). W ith th a t implemented, the signal emitted from the Nedaps was 
fairly limited. However, the intelligence agency also looked into the other type 
of voting machine, the touch-screen based system produced by the former state 
press Sdu. They found th a t the tem pest issue was much worse there, and someone 
outside the polling station might be able to  reconstruct the whole screen from 
the signal.
The technical requirements only stated tha t voting machines should maintain 
the secrecy of the vote in  storing the vote, not in casting (see page 4). Nonethe­
less, the minister suspended the certification for the Sdu machines three weeks 
before the elections, because the Election Law requires tha t machines are certi­
fied only if the secrecy of the ballot is guaranteed. In the background legal threats 
from the pressure group played a mayor role. The suspension affected about 10% 
of the voter population, including Amsterdam. Some districts got spare Nedaps, 
but others had to  use paper ballots, especially because the certification of one 
of the older Nedap types was suspended later.
There was some discussion about whether eavesdropping on election day was 
such a realistic scenario tha t it would justify the suspension. In any case, the 
pressure group was very happy to have a major event tha t backed their concerns, 
even though the focus had shifted from verifiability to  secrecy. And the minister 
was happy to have created an image of a decisive government.
In the beginning of 2007, there was an attem pt to re-certify the Sdu ma­
chines for the elections for the provinces. However, machines with reduced radio­
emission turned out to be unreadable for the colourblind, and Sdu had apparently 
made mistakes in the machines delivered to the testing agency. In the end, the 
minister extended the suspension. Sdu demanded a new test in a court case, but 
the machines failed the test again.
The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations explained their point 
of view on the controversy on their website. They stated tha t apart from the 
secrecy problem due to the tempest attacks, the security of the machines is 
acceptable. They argued tha t in the Dutch proportional system, as opposed to 
the Anglo-Saxon district-based system, small numbers of votes will not have any 
major influence on the result. Besides, existing guarantees were thought to be 
sufficient in order to prevent fraud.7
3.2 T w o co m m itte e s
Another concession of the minister was the initiation of two commissions of 
independent experts, who would look into, respectively, the past and future of 
e-voting. The former was the Commission Decision Process Voting Machines8, 
the second the Election Process Advisory Commission9.
7 http://w w w .m inbzk.nl/onderw erpen/grondw et_en/verkiezingen_en/ 
stemmachines, consulted February 13, 2007, not online anymore.
8 Members: drs. L.M.L.H.A. Hermans and prof. dr. M.J.W. van Twist.
9 Members: mr. F. Korthals Altes (chairman), prof. mr. J.M. Barendrecht, prof. dr. 
B.P.F. Jacobs, C. Meesters and M.J.C. van der Wel MBA.
In March 2007, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) reported on the Dutch elections [27]. On April 16, the Commission 
Decision Process Voting Machines published its report [15]. Both reports argued 
for increased verifiability, by means of a paper trail or equivalent procedure. It 
was not made clear what kind of (technical) procedures, discussed in the previous 
section, would count as equivalent.
The report of the Commission Decision Process Voting Machines was quite 
critical about the role of the government in the electronic voting problems. There 
was too little expertise with the government, and it was too dependent on exter­
nal parties for the running of elections. The role of TNO as both designer and 
tester of the machines was questioned. The legal requirements came too late, 
contained too little security, and did not address the counting software. Also, 
the government had ignored earlier signals of concern. The government humbly 
accepted the conclusions, and moved the election process to a more technology- 
oriented department. There was also an attem pt to redraft the requirements.
On September 27, the Election Process Advisory Commission reported on 
the future of the electoral process in the Netherlands [2]. The report stated that 
the primary form of voting should be voting in a polling station. Internet voting 
for the whole population would not be able to guarantee transparency, secrecy 
and freedom of the vote sufficiently—for the foreseeable future. It was advised 
to equip polling stations with “ballot printers” and “vote counters” instead of 
electronic voting machines, providing a paper vote in between the two stages. 
Ballot printers would only print the voter’s choice, which would then be verified 
by the voter and put in a ballot box. After the close of the polls, the vote counter 
would scan the votes and calculate the totals.
The American solution of a paper trail was not advised. It was argued that 
registering the vote twice, electronically and on paper, could lead to different 
outcomes, depending on which registration would have priority in case of a dis­
pute. Significantly, systems without a paper copy of the vote were not considered 
as alternatives, for reasons of transparency.
On October 21, 2007, the existing regulation allowing voting machines was 
withdrawn. A technical expert group was formed to investigate the practical 
issues involved in the commission’s proposal for the new method of voting.
After further research into the tem pest issue [20], the option of a ballot printer 
was judged not to be feasible. A tempest-protected prototype vote printer was 
built (see Figure 2), with a thick metal shield, but turned out to be too heavy 
for practical use (almost 100kg). Most importantly, however, the procedures for 
testing thousands of machines individually for tempest compliance were thought 
to be way too complicated. Additional measures tha t are used for tem pest pro­
tection, like forbidding mobile phones and restricting access to e.g. adjacent 
rooms, turned out to be incompatible with the open nature of elections: you 
don’t want to  run them  as a high-security military style operation.
Machine counting of manually cast paper votes was not seriously considered: 
the huge ballots used in the Netherlands are impossible to feed automatically 
into a machine. Besides, problems in the United Kingdom with this type of e-
Fig. 2. A prototype tempest-shielded voteprinter, with touch screen and protected tray 
for the printed vote.
counting were a reason for the Election Process Advisory Commission not to 
recommend this option.
On May 16, 2008, the government decided tha t voting would be on paper for 
the near future. An experiment with machines similar to the Nedaps for counting 
by the poll workers only was still proposed. They would then enter the paper 
votes manually into the machine. Because of the separation between the voter 
and the entering of the vote in the machine, this would resolve the tempest issue. 
However, parliament could not be convinced tha t this would reduce the other 
security problems involved in electronic voting, and rejected the option.
Thus, in the summer of 2008, the discussion was closed and the Netherlands 
returned to paper voting, with manual counting of the ballots. Inevitably this will 
lead to delays in partial results and prognoses on election night—and possibly 
to a restart of the discussion.
Looking back one must acknowledge th a t the pressure group has been in­
credibly effective and has reached its goals in a remarkably short time. It relied 
on a clear vision, technical skills, bravery, effective use of freedom of information 
rights, professional communication via their own newsletter and a very infor­
mative webpage, frequent and convincing media appearances, and, in the end, 
threats of legal actions. No politician (or civil servant) likes to have such an 
adversary.
3.3 T he G erm an con stitu tion a l court
Nedap voting machines were also used in parts of Germany and France. The 
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) was asked for a ver­
dict by the Chaos Computer Club (CCC)10. On March 3, 2009, the Court ruled 
that the use of these machines in elections in Germany was unconstitutional be­
cause of lack of transparency and verifiability by ordinary citizens. This verdict 
came too late to have any impact in the Netherlands, but it was received as a 
confirmation of the decision to abolish voting machines earlier on.
4 Internet vo tin g
In the Netherlands, several experiments have been performed with voting via 
the Internet. During the European elections 2004, Dutch citizens living abroad 
could vote online for the first time. Moreover, elections for two water boards 
have combined postal ballots with Internet voting in fall 2004, with a total of 
120,000 actual online voters. Hence these elections were among the larger ones, 
worldwide.
K iezen  op  A fs ta n d  (K O A ) The first of the two experiments in the Nether­
lands was initiated by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The 
experiment took place during the European elections in 2004. Participation was 
intended for expatriates, who only had the option to vote by mail before. This 
possibility is typically used by 20,000 - 30,000 people, of the about 600,000 po­
tential expat participants. They were given the opportunity to vote via Internet 
or phone. For this purpose, the KOA system was developed in 2003-2004,11 and 
a law regulating the experiment was passed through parliament.
The main setup of the system is as follows [11]. Voters register by ordinary 
mail, and choose their own access code as password. In return they receive a vote 
code as “login” , together with a list of candidates, each with her own candidate 
code. There were 1000 different lists in the experiment. Combining login and 
candidate code, one could then cast a vote.
The system was designed by Logica CMG. However, the government de­
manded the transfer of the intellectual property rights of the source code with 
the system. This made it possible to publish the source code after the elections. 
The source code zip file, published on the website www.ososs.nl, contained all 
Java code written specifically for the online voting system. Code tha t was part 
of general Logica CMG technology was not open source. This meant th a t it was 
only possible to inspect the (partial) source, not to compile and run it. A fully 
open-source version of the system has been developed later by Joe Kiniry and 
colleagues from Trinity College Dublin [19].
10 There was mutual inspiration, communication and exchange between the German 
and Dutch campaigns.
11 [24], see also http://w w w .m inbzk.nl/persoonsgegeven_en/kiezen_op_afstand, 
consulted October 11, 2005, not online anymore.
A follow-up trial was conducted in the national elections in 2006. However, 
the system used was different.
R ijn la n d  In te rn e t  E lec tio n  S y stem  A somewhat more sophisticated sys­
tem, called RIES, was developed with far less money by the water board of 
Rijnland12 together with two companies cooperating under the name T T P I13, 
based on earlier work by Robers [33]. A water board (Dutch: hoogheemraadschap 
or waterschap) is a regional government body for water management. Because 
the water boards are not bound by the Dutch election law, they are relatively 
free in their means of voting. Its officials are usually elected via ordinary mail, 
but voter participation for these elections is typically fairly low. An experiment 
with election via the Internet has been conducted in the regions Rijnland and 
Dommel in 2004, with 1 million eligible voters. 120,000 people voted online, but 
turnout did not increase, against expectation and hope. RIES was also used in 
the second KOA remote voting experiment during the national elections in 2006, 
instead of the KOA system from 2004.
The RIES system uses cryptographic operations to protect votes and at the 
same time offer good transparency, at least in principle. It is possible for voters 
to verify their vote after the elections, and for independent institutions to  do a 
full recount of the results. The Radboud University Nijmegen did such a recount 
for all elections in which the system was used, and confirmed the official results 
[17].
The RIES system uses hashes to publish a pre-election table, see [17,18]. Once 
the votes have been published, anyone can calculate the result of the election 
from the pre-election table and the table of received votes. Because of the use 
of hash functions, the system is relatively simple, offers protection of votes and 
allows scrutiny of the results. Whereas the hashes of all possible votes are public, 
it is (or should be) computationally infeasible to deduce valid votes from them 
without the required voter key.
The system works as follows. First of all, a reference table (see figure 3) 
is published before the elections, including (anonymously) for each voter the 
hashes of all possible votes, linking those to the candidates. The original votes 
are only derivable from a secret key handed to the voter. The confidentiality of 
these keys is achieved via organisational security measures, in the same way that 
identification codes for bank cards are handed out. It is possible to compare the 
number of voters in this table with the number of registered voters.
In the voting phase, voters use their secret to derive a valid vote for their 
desired candidate. This vote is then subm itted to the server via an encrypted 
connection.
After the elections a document with all received votes is published. This 
allows for two im portant verifications: a voter can verify his/her own vote, in­
12 h ttp ://w w w .rijn lan d .n e t and h ttp :/ /w w w .r ijn la n d k ie s t.n l , consulted May 28, 
2009.
13 h ttp :/ /w w w .ttp i.n l, consulted May 28, 2009.
cluding the correspondence to  the chosen candidate, and anyone can do an inde­
pendent calculation of the result of the elections, based on this document and the 
reference table published before the elections. If your vote has been registered 
wrongly, or not at all, you can detect it. And if the result is incorrect given the 
received votes, you can detect it as well.14
Archive: 01010204.zip
Length Date Time Name
2172 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_0.zip
4017 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_1.zip
2173 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_2.zip
1865 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_3.zip
2789 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_4.zip
3097 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_5.zip
2787 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_6.zip
1559 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_7.zip
1559 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_8.zip
2480 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_9.zip
2784 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_A.zip
3405 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_B.zip
2785 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_C.zip
1867 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_D.zip
1559 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_E.zip
3403 08-25-04 09 32 01010204/RT_F.zip
0 08-25-04 08 51 01010204/
40301 17 files
Archive: RT_0.zip
Length Date Time >ame
220 08-25-04 09 31 008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553
220 08-25-04 09 31 08677B73378E1D59153DE30263A3C47C
220 08-25-04 09 31 06CAC042AF7D6940DD8A51814E68DFF8
220 08-25-04 09 31 00FEA51461FBF7B406554EEF2E23554D
220 08-25-04 09 31 05C02BD8E3863DB24D6C332A17B78EFB
220 08-25-04 09 32 070C60BFFC06B7355425E6FFADBBED30
220 08-25-04 09 32 034C37BA687E21477D38A110954207B8
1540 7 files
0 0 8 A B 1 E 9 8 A E D F B A 4 5 0 A 1 8 1 3 D D C 1 5 3 5 5 3 :
vervangend=0
verstrekt=1
vervallen=0
AC94983743058334B25452E0F63A9C20=0101020401
B0015BAC8ECF766DB67825592DC10957=0101020402
ACE42133255CA8184D18E0293FEF7EE8=0101020403
358AAB0C934757ACCF071A1CD732EDEA=0101020499
Fig. 3. Reference table format. The reference table in the figure has been split into 16 
parts, which reside in different archive files. Each archive file (e.g. RT_0.zip) contains 
files for different voters, indicated by the hash of the voter’s identity. In these files, 
hashes of possible votes of such a voter are mapped to the corresponding candidates 
(e.g. candidate 0101020401).
The fundamental problem in the RIES system lies in the responsibility of the 
key generator to destroy the keys immediately after sending them to the voters. 
Failing to do this may compromise both the secrecy and the authenticity of votes.
14 Of course, procedures need to be put in place to decide what will happen in case of 
such a claim.
This allows the organisers, in principle, to vote on behalf of participants15. One 
may wish to improve on this issue by having the voters generate their keys 
themselves. Here, blind signatures may be useful: the voter can have exactly one 
key signed by the authorities, without making it public.
Another problem is tha t the verification procedure might be used to sell 
votes. If I let someone else verify my vote, he or she could pay me for making 
the right choice. If I would need a sm artcard to  verify a vote, this would already 
be less easy, but this would limit the accessibility and usability of the system.
The water boards intended to use RIES for their combined elections in Fall 
2008. This was not a particularly lucky time for the attem pt, as the deputy 
minister had just abolished the electronic voting machines in polling stations. 
Parliament demanded an independent evaluation, which was performed by the 
IT-security company Fox-IT. Internet voting for the water board elections was 
cancelled after this independent investigation reported additional security prob­
lems, such as brute force key search [14] and the possibility of SQL injection 
attacks [12]. Electronic counting of postal ballots for the water boards was con­
tinued, though.
As a result, Internet voting developments in the Netherlands have also come 
to a halt.
5 Trust in techn ology
Trust is a major, but confusing, issue in the discussion on electronic voting [29]. 
In the following, we briefly investigate the role it played in the controversy in 
the Netherlands.
Papers discussing trust in electronic voting often seem to be unsure about 
their definition of trust. In [9], in a section named “Increasing tru st” [emphasis 
added], the following sentence is found: “One way to decrease the trust voters 
must place in voting machine software is to let voters physically verify that 
their intent is recorded correctly.” [emphasis added] But was the intent not to 
increase trust? Do we wish to increase and decrease trust at the same time? 
W hat is happening here?
Apparently, computing scientists stem from a tradition in which minimising 
trust is the standard. “In computer security literature in general, the term  is 
used to denote tha t something must be trusted [...]. That is, something trusted 
is something tha t the users are necessarily dependent on.” [25] Because we m ust 
trust certain parts of the system for the whole system to be verifiably correct 
according to the computing science models, we want to minimise the size of the 
parts we have to  trust, thus minimising trust itself. This desire to minimise is 
clearly visible in efforts to reduced the so-called Trusted Computing Base (TCB). 
However, from a psychological perspective, or even a marketing perspective, it 
is desirable tha t users trust the whole system. Maximising trust seems to lead
15 Analogously, bank employees can, in principle, withdraw cash on behalf of clients 
because also possess PINs.
to more fluent interaction between the user and the system, and is therefore 
desirable.
To explain these two different types of trust, we consult the German soci­
ologist Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann [21] draws a distinction between trust and 
confidence. Both confidence and trust involve the formation of expectations with 
respect to contingent future events. But there is a difference.
According to  Luhmann, trust is always based on assessment of risks, and a 
decision whether or not to accept those. Confidence differs from trust in the sense 
that it does not presuppose a situation of risk. Confidence, instead, neglects the 
possibility of disappointment, not only because this case is rare, but also because 
there is not really a choice.16 Examples of confidence tha t Luhmann gives are 
expectations about politicians trying to avoid war, and of cars not suddenly 
breaking down and hitting you. In these cases, you cannot decide for yourself 
whether or not to  take the risk.
When there is a choice, trust takes over the function of confidence. Here, 
the risky situation is evaluated, and a decision is made about whether or not 
to take the risk: “If you do not consider alternatives [...] you are in a situation 
of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others [...], you define 
the situation as one of trust.” [21] If you choose to drive a car by evaluating the 
risks and accepting them, this is a form of trust. The essential feature of trust 
as opposed to confidence is the comparison of alternatives.
Computing scientists generally try  to replace confidence with trust, i.e. ex­
change unconscious dependence on a system for explicit evaluation of the risks, 
and minimising the parts in which we still have to have confidence. Thus, they 
wish to minimise confidence and maximise trust (in the terminology of Luh- 
mann). But they do not always state it this way. Philosophers (and social sci­
entists), instead, recognise the positive aspects of confidence, and may evaluate 
positively people having a relation of assurance with the system without exactly 
knowing its risks (i.e. confidence). This is not meant as a conclusion tha t holds 
universally, but rather as an indication of the role of the scientific subcultures 
in the debates.
Electronic voting systems may be seen as alternatives to the existing system. 
W hether this is indeed the case depends on the situation. If the new technologies 
are not seen as an alternative, but as an improvement of existing procedures, 
electronic devices are more attractive, because they are more reliable and thus 
more easily acquire confidence. In the Netherlands, the pressure group created 
in their arguments a clear distinction between paper voting on the one hand and 
electronic voting on the other: they were said to  be fundamentally different. If 
electronic voting is seen as a really different alternative to paper voting, which 
the pressure group encouraged, people suddenly get the option to decide on a
16 Some native English speakers have noted that this distinction seems to be counter­
intuitive. They would rather use the word “trust” for a situation which one has 
not analysed, and confidence for a more rational form of assurance. In order to 
avoid confusion in comparison with Luhmann’s original text, I will still follow the 
terminology as introduced there.
voting system. This invites actively revealing the risks of the different systems, 
and basing the decision on an analysis of these risks. This means that trust now 
becomes the dominant form of assurance, as opposed to confidence. This has as 
a consequence tha t voting systems are required to be trustworthy rather than 
reliable only.
By making the distinction between paper voting and e-voting, the pressure 
group thus created a set of alternatives, requiring a decision, and changing the 
expectations from reliability to  trustworthiness. For now, it seems tha t no exist­
ing voting technology can meet the high demands associated with a comparison 
with paper voting. Still, the Dutch government indicates tha t they will follow 
the technical developments, and most people involved seem to think th a t the dis­
cussion on electronic voting will re-emerge in the next decade. One interesting 
question is if socio-technical developments will have made it possible for elec­
tronic voting to acquire trust by then. This is especially interesting for Internet 
voting, since it changes some existing assumptions about the election process.
If it were possible for a technology like Internet voting to acquire trust, this 
is not merely a technical achievement. New information technologies, like mobile 
phones, do not merely solve a communication problem. They may profoundly 
change the experiences and behaviour of citizens [38], and we have indeed seen 
this in the mobile phone case. W ith Internet voting, the character of voting as 
a public ritual is abandoned. Instead, people vote in a private place, with no 
incentive to abandon their private interests and vote for the “greater good” [32, 
26]. Even if it is generally not considered acceptable now, future developments 
may make it possible to link the voting site directly to the sites of political 
parties, voting advice websites, or discussion fora. It may even become possible 
to follow the advice of a private organisation and cast this vote directly from 
their website. This fundamentally changes the place of voting in the democratic 
process. Also, the fact tha t the government no longer takes responsibility for the 
secrecy of the vote may change the importance of the secret ballot. People may 
vote with their families or friends, and new ways have to be found to prevent 
undesirable social influence. W hat, then, is autonomy in voting really? Or in 
general?
Also, the idea of multi-channel elections, where people can choose the com­
munication medium that most suits them, changes the way we think about equal 
access in elections. If there is a single channel, like a polling station, some people 
may live closer than others, but it is generally accepted th a t this does not con­
stitute an unfair advantage. If people with Internet access can vote from home 
while others cannot, the acceptability of this inequality is not so trivial. More­
over, the whole system will then be as secure as the least secure channel. Even 
if fair voters choose the most secure one, unfair voters may take advantage of 
weaknesses in other channels.
If and when the discussion on electronic voting gets back on the agenda, 
these issues should be subject to public debate. Otherwise, we may end up in 
the same situation as with the Dutch voting machines: we did have confidence,
but in the end, we had to acknowledge tha t we failed to address all the issues 
involved, so th a t the technology did not deserve our trust.
6 C onclusions
The Netherlands were both an early adopter and an early abolisher of electronic 
voting. When electronic voting machines were introduced, verifiability was not an 
issue, and the machines did not include advanced means for verification of votes 
or results. Questions about the machines were put on the political agenda by a 
pressure group from 2006. This group also pointed to tempest problems, next to 
security issues with the integrity of the machines. An alternative voting method 
was devised by the Election Process Advisory Commission, which consisted of a 
ballot printer and a vote counter, where only a paper printout of the vote would 
form the connection between the two stages. However, because of the tempest 
issue, designing and testing a sufficiently protected ballot printer was judged to 
be infeasible in any practical election process. Practical issues thus were a major 
feature in the Dutch electronic voting history.
The experiments with Internet voting showed tha t fundamental design issues 
as well as practical details can contribute to the success or failure of Internet 
voting experiments. The environment may be crucial as well; the demise of the 
voting machines was not a particularly encouraging event for risking the large- 
scale elections the water boards had planned.
The success of the pressure group in the Netherlands can be explained in 
terms of confidence and trust. Whereas the Dutch machines were reliable enough 
to have confidence, they were not trustworthy enough to survive a critical com­
parison to the alternative of paper voting.
The big questions, although partially addressed in the Dutch debate, still 
remain largely unanswered:
1. W hat are essential requirements in e-voting, and what do they mean?
2. W hat are the threats?
3. Which techniques should be used to counter them?
E pilogue  a b o u t  th e  a u th o rs  a n d  th e ir  invo lvem en t
Given the broad descriptive character of this article it is appropriate to make the 
authors’ roles and involvement explicit. The second author (W P) has done his 
PhD work [31] from 2003 to  2007 within the computer security research group 
at the Radboud University of Nijmegen, where the first author (BJ) holds a 
professorship. The group has been involved in several evaluation activities with 
respect to e-voting (KOA, RIES), often together with colleague Engelbert Hub- 
bers, and sometimes on a commercial basis. This resulted in several publications, 
such as [17, 30,18]. Also, the group played a public role in some of the societal 
discussions around voting in the Netherlands.
The first author was a member of the Commission Decision Process Voting 
Machines, and was chair of the subsequent more technical commission tha t stud­
ied the tempest issue (see section 3). The second author worked for the Ministry 
of the Interior from September 2007 until July 2008, on electronic voting and 
travel documents. Currently he is researching information security at the Uni­
versity of Twente. This text is not based on any non-public information obtained 
from the authors’ work in these commissions or at the Ministry.
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